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Abstract: This article analyzes the contributions of Albert O. Hirschman to the field of political economy and his issues with public 
choice. Although he was not explicitly affiliated to any school of thought, Hirschman worked with both disciplines of economics and 
political science to understand questions such as “why do people vote and participate in politics?” He was disappointed with what 
mainstream economics provided and elaborated the exit-voice-loyalty (EVL) model to understand mechanisms of action in politics 
and the economy. His EVL model has been widely read, but it did not develop a paradigm around it and was ignored by economists 
due to its lack of formal models. His work was thus at odds with public choice theory. He also criticized the concept of free-riding 
and the application of rational choice theory to politics. Hirschman went on to work on a political economy of citizenship in his works 
(Hirschman, 1977, [1982] 2002, 1991), to find answers apart from rational choice theory, which he considered harmful to political 
participation.
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[es] En contra de un mundo sin voz: la economía política de Albert O. Hirschman como alternativa a 
la teoría de la elección pública
Resumen: Este articulo analiza las contribuciones de Albert O. Hirschman al campo de la economía política y sus posiciones frente 
a la teoría de la elección pública. A pesar de no estar explícitamente afiliado a una escuela de pensamiento, Hirschman trabajó tanto 
con la economía como con la ciencia política para elucidar preguntas como “¿por qué las personas eligen votar y participar en la 
política?” Decepcionado con los aportes de la economía convencional, elaboró el modelo de salida-voz-lealtad (SVL) para comprender 
los mecanismos que regulan la acción en la política y la economía. A pesar de que sus contribuciones sobre el modelo SLV han sido 
ampliamente leídas, Hirschman no alcanzó a desarrollar un paradigma alrededor de este modelo, que terminó siendo ignorado por los 
economistas debido a la ausencia de modelos formales en él. Por lo tanto, su obra iba en contradirección de la teoría de la elección 
pública. Hirschman también fue crítico del concepto de free-riding y de la aplicación de la teoría de la elección racional a la política. En 
obras posteriores, Hirschman (1977, [1982] 2002, 1991) continuó realizando aportes a una economía política de la ciudadanía, con el 
fin de proveer respuestas alternativas a las de la teoría de la elección racional, que consideraba prejudicial para la participación política.
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Resumo: Esse artigo analisa as contribuições de Albert Hirschman para o campo da economia política e a sua controvérsia com a 
escolha pública. Apesar de ele não estar explicitamente afiliado a nenhuma escola de pensamento, Hirschman trabalhou tanto com 
economia e ciência política para compreender questões do tipo ‘porque as pessoas votam e participam da política?’. Ele se desapontou 
com o que a economia mainstream ofereceria e elaborou o modelo de voz-saída-lealdade (VSL), para entender os mecanismos de ação 
na política e na economia. Seu modelo VSL foi bastante lido, apesar de não desenvolver modelos formais. Seu trabalho discordava 
da teoria da escolha pública; ele criticou o conceito de free-riding e a aplicação da teoria da escolha racional à política. Hirschman 
trabalhou com a economia política da cidadania em seus trabalhos no fim da sua carreira (Hirschman, 1977, [1982] 2002, 1991), a 
fim de providenciar respostas a questões de economia política longe da teoria da escolha racional, considerando-a prejudicial para a 
participação política.
Palavras-chave: Albert Hirschman, escolha pública, economia política, cidadania
Códigos JEL: B25, D7
Sumario: 1. Introduction. 2. Voice and Exit: a review. 3. Relevant critiques of Hirschman’s EVL model. 4. Hirschman’s alternative 
project of political economics for citizenship. 5. Conclusion. Bibliography.
Cómo citar: Galvão de Almeida, R. (2021): “Against a voiceless world: Albert O. Hirschman’s political economics as an alternative 
to public choice” en Iberian Journal of the History of Economic Thought 8(1), 13-22.
1 The Federal University of Minas Gerais, CEDEPLAR
 E-mail: rga1605@gmail.com
 I would like to thank Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak, Alexandre Mendes Cunha, Andres Guiot, and two anonymous referees for their comments. I would 
also thank Sarah Patton and Diana Sykes from the Hoover Institution for providing the Tullock-Hirschman correspondence.
 ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3582-9906
SEGUDNAS-IberianJournalOfTheHistoryOfEconomicThought8(1).indd   13 20/5/21   19:43
14 Galvão de Almeida, R. Iber. hist. econ. thought. 8(1) 2021: 13-22
1. Introduction
The 1960s saw mainstream economic theory being 
criticized for ignoring issues of political economy, 
i.e. the relationship between economics and poli-
tics (Heilbroner, 1970). Economists affiliated to the 
Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE) and 
the Public Choice Society (PCS) challenged the or-
thodox economic assumptions on politics. Both as-
sociations would welcome interdisciplinary research 
between economics and other social disciplines (Am-
adae, 2003; Mata, 2009). This critique also attracted 
scholars that were not explicitly affiliated to any as-
sociation or school of thought.
One of them was Albert Otto Hirschman (1915-
2012). Just as disappointed with orthodox economics 
as the members of URPE and PCS, he had a project 
that associated the “political dimensions of econom-
ic phenomena” to be intimately related to the “terms 
of development sequences in which political and 
economic forces interact”, interfering directly in the 
“processes of social change” (Hirschman, 1971, 1). 
He labeled his approach “political economy”, “polit-
ical economics” or “politics cum economics” (ibid., 
7), though the term that is usually associated with it 
is “political economics” (Guiot, 2017)2.
Hirschman’s most important framework of po-
litical economics was the exit-voice-loyalty (EVL) 
model (Hirschman, 1970). He suggested the mecha-
nisms of exit and voice as a way of synthetizing how 
collective action could take place within economic 
and political realms. This would become an impor-
tant part of his project of political economics. The 
model remained an important contribution to polit-
ical economy due to the wideness of its audience, 
even though it failed to produce a paradigm and to 
decisively influence the economic profession3.
His approach stood between the URPE4 and PCS 
alternatives, occupying a similar academic niche. 
While Grofman (2002, 31-32), a former president of 
PCS, considered the EVL model important to public 
choice in general, Hirschman had an antagonistic re-
lationship with public choice itself, as shown from 
his writings and interviews.
Initially, Hirschman had an interest in public 
choice. In correspondence with Gordon Tullock, 
which extended from November 1961 to February 
1962 (Hirschman, 1961a,b, 1962; Tullock, 1961a,b, 
1962), he had interest in the latter’s work and wrote 
2 Hirschman opposed using the term “new political economy” to refer to his approach because he considered mainstream economics coopted the 
term, and it was just an economic analysis of politics, not a truly integrated way to think about social science (Hirschman, 1971, 3). For a more 
“conventional” political economics, which Hirschman would consider an example of this difference, see the equally titled Political Economics 
(Persson, Tabellini, 2000).
3 Commenting on Hirschman (1958), Paul Krugman (1994) wrote that “it is a rich book, full of stimulating ideas. Its most important message at 
that time, however, was a rejection of the drive toward rigor. In effect, Hirschman said that both the theorist and the practical policymaker could 
and should ignore the pressures to produce buttoned-down, mathematically consistent analyses, and adopt instead a sort of muscular pragmatism 
in grappling with the problem of development. Along with some others, notably Myrdal, Hirschman did not wait for intellectual exile: he proudly 
gathered up his followers and led them into the wilderness himself. Unfortunately, they perished there.”
4 Hirschman himself did not have relevant contact with radical political economics and its scholars. In his review of Adelman (2013) for the Review 
of Radical Political Economics, Perelman (2015, 324) wrote that Hirschman was neither a socialist nor favored governments, though he was sym-
pathetic to left liberal causes. He concluded that Hirschman’s work “should be of great interest to radicals today.”
that they were exploring similar issues (Hirschman, 
1962). Tullock lent him his own mimeographed copy 
of Calculus of Consent and appreciated Hirschman’s 
interest, but remarked: “I think you are probably right 
about the interrelationship between our projects. In 
general, however, we are interested in studying how 
institutions work to find out if the institutions can 
be improved. The ultimate objective differs from 
yours” (Tullock, 1962, emphasis added). Tullock and 
Hirschman would interact again in the future, but 
with worse results, as we will see below.
This article explores the conflict between 
Hirschman and public choice theory and its influence 
in the development of Hirschman’s ideas. The arti-
cle is divided in four sections, besides this introduc-
tion: in Section 2, I review Hirschman’s concepts of 
voice, exit and loyalty; in Section 3 I present criti-
cal reviews to his model relevant to changes in his 
thought; in Section 4 I discuss Hirschman’s project 
of an alternative political economics, focused on po-
litical participation; and I conclude in Section 5, by 
showing how distant Hirschman became from ortho-
dox economics.
2. Voice and Exit: a review
Hirschman was interested in political economy ever 
since the beginning of his career. In National power 
and the structure of foreign trade ([1945] 1980), a 
book based on his PhD dissertation at the University 
of Trieste, he analyzed the influence of internation-
al trade in the power relationships between nations. 
In Strategy of economic development (Hirschman, 
1958), he reminds the reader that “economic devel-
opment has often been a by-product of the quest for 
political and military power” (ibid., 10, emphasis 
added). Political economics, in his own words, was 
considered a “no man’s land” in the 1960s (Swed-
berg, 1990, 155). It was with the EVL model, how-
ever, that he would “definitely” tackle politics and 
economics.
Hirschman’s concern over the relevance of col-
lective action to economic policy is linked to his 
skepticism towards the orthodox development poli-
cies prescribed by the World Bank and similar insti-
tutions. He recalls that, back in the 1950s, economists 
saw themselves as “revolutionaries” that wanted to 
restart the countries they were assigned to from the 
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scratch, under the auspices of the truth revealed by 
economic theory (Hirschman, 1984a, 94)5. They had 
failed to incorporate political economy in their mod-
els. He had been introduced to issues of collective 
decision making/public choice while as an advisor in 
Colombia (Álvarez, Guiot and Hurtado, 2019). He 
concluded that, if economists in developed countries 
tended to ignore political economy, the situation was 
even worse in underdeveloped countries (Hirschman, 
1971, 255). His experience with the failure of the Ni-
gerian railroad transport system would act as a cata-
lyzer of his ideas6 – an episode in which competition 
among trains and trucks made the consumers aban-
don train transport, thus contributing to its decadence 
(Hirschman, 1970, vii).
The construction of the Bornu railway exten-
sion was financed by the World Bank. Hirschman 
was one of the economists who analyzed the project 
(Hirschman, 1969, 146-155). He considered it a fail-
ure for many reasons, but the most important one was 
the division of authority. The distribution of man-
agement positions in the railroad needed to balance 
the many ethnic groups of the Nigerian state, to be a 
symbol of national integration. Despite this official 
rhetoric, Nigerian historian Tokunbo Aderemi Ayoo-
la wrote that the Bornu extension was a means for the 
British to protect their interests after the eventual Ni-
gerian independence, in an alliance with the North-
ern elites; it had poor economic planning since its 
inception (Ayoola, 2006, 2018). Contrariwise, rail-
roads became a locus to insufflate ethnical rivalries, 
favoritism, and inefficiency. Trucks, however, did not 
have these problems in the same scale and were bet-
ter adapted to the Nigerian ethnic problem through 
service specialization (with companies that directed 
their services to specific ethnic groups). According 
to Adelman, the Nigerian failure affected Hirschman 
profoundly because, months after evaluating the pro-
ject, the Biafra Civil War started, and he was terrified 
by the possibility that the failure of Bornu might have 
contributed to one of the most horrific civil wars of 
the time7. For him, “economists needed to grapple 
with the unintended consequences of their thought” 
(Adelman, 2013, 422).
In his view, economics alone could not explain the 
failure of the Nigerian railroad system. To tackle the 
issues of how political and economic influences min-
gle with each other, he developed in the book Exit, 
Voice and Loyalty a triad of concepts to shed light 
on the subject. “Voice” was the name given to the 
active mechanism, which included speaking against 
perceived injustices, contesting decisions, organizing 
5 He coined the term “visiting-economist syndrome” (Hirschman, 1984a, 93) to criticize this attitude from economists, usually from central countries, 
who are sent to peripheral countries with a lot of knowledge of economic theory, but ignorant of said countries actual problems and real needs. See 
Bianchi (2011).
6 See Adelman (2013) chapter 14, for more influences. I chose to focus on the Bornu terminal due to its scale, influence in Hirschman’s career, and 
because its collective action problem is more prominent.
7 According to Jerome Agu Nwadike (2010, 8-9), a former Biafran soldier, the former British colonial power divided the 250 ethnic groups in the 
Nigerian territory into three regions: North, South, and East. The area around the Bornu railway also contained most military assets and other 
installations that concentrated the destination of most taxpayers’ money, and the North used it to establish military hegemony. This led to unrest in 
the Eastern region, where Biafra was located, and, eventually, civil war.
protests and strikes, among others; “exit” was how 
he named the passive mechanism – defection, chang-
ing products and leaving places; while “loyalty” was 
the force that deterred exit, thus allowing the voice 
mechanism to be explored (ibid., 438).
In economics, the competition mechanism is a 
manifestation of exit: when the price of a product in-
creases, consumers migrate to cheaper ones. In con-
trast, voice is more analyzed in political science: to 
remain inside an arrangement and try to influence the 
situation to return to a better level. Examples of eco-
nomic application of voice are consumers who send 
letters to the producer to complain about a reduction 
in quality, instead of automatically shifting to another 
product.
As said before, competition provides a basic ex-
ample of how economists tend to favor exit mech-
anisms. If something is not palatable to consumers, 
they change to another product, without any need to 
explain their reasons to producers. It is an impersonal 
process. Hirschman, however, argued there are situa-
tions in which exit may turn the situation worse. The 
example of the Bornu railway shows how competi-
tion, along with the incompetence of railroad manag-
ers, can induce the clients who value quality most to 
leave and let the railroads and their remaining users 
in a worse situation:
Exit did not have its usual attention-focusing effect 
because the loss of revenue was not a matter of the 
utmost gravity for management, while voice did not 
work if the most aroused and therefore the potentially 
most vocal customers were the first ones to abandon 
the railroads for the trucks. (Hirschman, 1970, 45).
Hirschman identified an underlying presumption 
among economists: “competition is the all-powerful 
social institution bringing pressures for efficiency” 
(Hirschman, 1984a, 99); the efficiency of the mar-
ket will lead the economy into a superior position in 
the production possibility frontier, by eliminating the 
less able and rewarding the best. Hirschman tried to 
understand why this is not always the case.
In the Nigerian example, the managers of the 
railroads used their economic power to improve the 
economic position of their families and clans instead 
of the nation in general –a clear problem of pub-
lic choice/collective decision-making (Hirschman, 
1969, 147)–. Those who control a market niche will 
take measures to preserve said niche and its rents. In 
the case of the Nigerian railroads, the exit of the best 
consumers made the service even worse, but it did 
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not hurt the rents of railroad owners, allowing their 
power to stay unharmed.
Hirschman mentioned other examples, such as 
American public schools (the exit of good students 
leads to drop in quality, but the schools do not usually 
close) and the indiscriminate selling of stocks in bear 
markets, considered a bad, but widespread manage-
ment practice in the business literature (Hirschman, 
1970, 46). If the first consumers to leave are the ones 
who value quality most, without them producers 
have incentives to become lazier and degenerate their 
products. The market may remove these producers, 
but if their cost of staying in the market is not large 
enough, they will remain for a time longer than ex-
pected by economic theory.
In contrast, voice differs from exit both in its ac-
tive character and in its methods. It can be defined as 
any attempt to change a situation instead of defecting 
and can also be called “interest articulation” (ibid., 
40). Voice can be manifested by different methods, 
such as strikes, protests, complaints, among other 
forms of articulation around an objective. Thus, a cli-
ent who writes a letter to a producer or workers who 
start a strike are articulating their interest because 
they do not want or cannot use exit.
Lastly, there is loyalty. Hirschman considered 
loyalty the factor that decreases the odds of exiting 
– in other words, the higher the loyalty, the more 
agents will try to use their voices, supposedly, with 
the intention of staying and improving the situation, 
instead of exiting (ibid., 77). This would explain why 
consumers most invested in quality would not leave 
the moment the quality of a product dropped. They 
would likely leave after seeing their loyalty ignored 
or unrewarded.
Voice and exit represent different approaches and 
can be treated either as alternatives or complements to 
each other. One possibility is to frame the problem in 
terms of cost-benefit analysis: if consumers are likely 
to be loyal to a brand, they will tend to exert their voice 
in the hopes of improving the product. Hirschman, 
however, feared that the emphasis of economists on 
exit implied a negligence of voice. Due to his own 
experience, Hirschman was more concerned with this 
case, especially since the economic method was start-
ing to spread to other fields8.
In later years, Hirschman came to see voice and 
exit as complementary (e.g., Hirschman, 1993). In 
fact, interpreting voice and exit as cancelling each 
8 Hirschman was suspicious of “economics imperialism”. In an interview in the 1980s (Swedberg, 1990, 158-160), he said that he was “hostile to that 
approach” because of its reductionism and because the most important political actions go against the rational choice of not participating. Not only 
that, but he also claimed that economics is guided by excessive parsimony, not allowing it to examine higher complexity phenomena, thus making 
economics potentially harmful when exported to other disciplines (Hirschman, 1984b).
9 As of May 2021, the number of citations in Google Scholar to Hirschman (1970) surpasses 28 thousand. For a single work possessing this number 
of citations, it is safe to say that it was read by and influenced a good number of scientists and researchers.
10 Olson wrote in an article reviewing Journey Towards Progress along with other books that Hirschman’s work was the best of all the reviewed 
books (Olson, 1965b). However, his review missed the point by focusing solely on the descriptions of Latin American institutions instead of policy 
recommendations – if we compare Hirschman’s work to a painting, Olson praised it more for its frame than the painting.
11 In The Logic of Collective Action, Olson gave an interdisciplinary tone to the book, with quotations of authors from social psychology (Festinger), 
sociology (Weber), and even praising Marx upon saying that he “developed an interesting and provocative economic theory of the state at a time 
when most other economists had not even begun to consider the question” (Olson, 1965a, 102).
other is currently considered a wrongful interpreta-
tion of his work –as Dowding and John (2012, 131) 
wrote, “people weigh up the relative benefits and time 
horizons of voice and exit, trading one for the other 
both immediately and over time. For Hirschman, it 
is the trade-off and how loyalty affects it that is im-
portant. In many applications of Hirschman’s frame-
work, the trade-off is forgotten as social scientists 
only consider exit or voice independently.”
3. Relevant critiques of Hirschman’s EVL model
At the time of its publication, Adelman (2013, 440) 
wrote that Hirschman (1970) was an “immediate sen-
sation” due to the amplitude of issues it covered, its 
accessible language, and for capturing the zeitgeist 
of the time9. The acceptance, however, was not unan-
imous. The focus of this section is on the most im-
portant negative reviews of the book, related to the 
rational choice theory debate.
Edward Kane, then book review editor of the 
Journal of Finance, wanted to introduce its readers to 
discussions in political economy and contacted Gor-
don Tullock to review a couple of books, including 
Hirschman (1970). In the letter, dated 11 June 1970, 
accompanying his review, Tullock (1970a) wrote that 
“as you can see, I didn’t like the book”. To him, the 
simplest explanation to the case of Nigerian railroads 
would be that if there were no trucks in Nigeria, the 
railroad would just continue to extract money from 
taxpayers and refuse to improve its service. In other 
words, voice would accomplish little if there was a 
monopoly. He concluded the book had little value to 
tackle the issues it raised (Tullock, 1970b, 1195).
The review created a qualm between Hirschman 
and public choice. Mancur Olson, who had previ-
ously praised Hirschman’s work10, intervened with a 
letter to Hirschman apologizing for the tone of Tull-
ock’s review (Adelman, 2013, 447). Olson was also 
the then-president of the Public Choice Society, and 
he advocated for the convergence between students 
of political economy, independent of their ideologi-
cal preferences (Olson, Clague, 1971)11. Thus, he was 
interested in building bridges.
Olson’s letter also touched on the “ideological 
gap” separating Tullock and Hirschman. Olson ex-
plained that Tullock was on “the far right of the old 
classical liberal or laissez-faire conservative tradi-
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tion, and you are surely not on that side” (Adelman, 
2013, 447)12. Olson’s choice of words might im-
ply that Tullock took issue with Hirschman for not 
adopting a free-market approach to the voice and exit 
problem –in other words, that the review was more 
ideological than technical–. Olson also argued that 
not having Hirschman as part of the Public Choice 
Society was like Robert Solow having nothing to do 
with the Econometric Society (ibid., 448). Hirschman 
thanked the letter but announced he would not take 
part in the activities of PCS anymore.
The harshest criticism, however, came from a 
long review by Brian Barry (1974). He recognized 
that Hirschman had good points, but there were prob-
lems with his analysis. He dismissed the novelty of 
Hirschman’s approach, mentioning that the prob-
lem had already been studied by Olson and Anthony 
Downs. Barry also cited many problems of his mod-
el, such as “loyalty” being an equation filler and that 
Hirschman chose to ignore economic logic and for-
mal models (ibid., 86). The lack of formal modelling 
would become a problem for many researchers13.
In the end, many parts of his model, including the 
very concepts of “voice” and “exit”, were ambiguous 
and unclear. “Much of the work in comparative pol-
itics uses the EVL framework merely to give a label 
to some of the processes under discussion and none 
tests Hirschman’s purported interactions” (Dowding 
et al., 2000, 478). The massive number of citations 
observed in Note 9 may thus mean there are as many 
interpretations of EVL as there are citations to it, hin-
dering the creation a paradigm.
For a conventional economist, the EVL model 
might have been interesting “literary” analysis, but 
of little serviceability since it did not have any for-
mal empirically testable model. In contrast, the EVL 
model is considered similar to the Tiebout model of 
electoral migrations (Tiebout, 1956), which was a for-
mal, though incipient model preceding Hirschman’s 
“exit” mechanism. Inspired by the Tiebout model, 
some rational choice theorists saw the formalization 
of the EVL model as a challenge. Keith Dowding and 
Peter John, for example, argued that one of the main 
flaws of Hirschman’s model is that, despite consid-
ering the intention of change, it did not consider the 
action of change (Dowding, John, 1996). They devel-
oped a formal EVL model, to attract the economists’ 
attention (Dowding, John, 2012). Hirschman’s own 
work, however, went in another direction.
12 His concerns about Tullock’s intransigent free-market ideology were already present in his review of The calculus of consent (Olson, 1962).
13 Barry was himself a critic of the public choice movement too: “…it is obviously important to establish that the ‘economic’ assumptions are not 
universally and immutably true […] we have found to be, roughly, that the theory falls down when it is applied to people for whom participation is 
not a cost, and these, at any rate in our sort of society, are predominantly middle class people” (Barry, 1978 [1970], 178). Hirschman conceded Barry 
had important points, including that he should pay closer attention to the economic side of equation (cf. Swedberg, 1990, 159) and this stimulated 
further critique of Olson in future works (Hirschman, 2002 [1982], 78).
14 In an interview, when asked who his “enemies” were, he counted Olson as one of them (Hirschman, 2000 [1985], 93).
15 Andrés Guiot (personal correspondence) suggested that his use of the term “political economics” in Bias for Hope indicated he might have public 
choice in mind. Hirschman mentioned Olson and Downs by name as examples of theorists working on the intersection between politics and eco-
nomics, but he does not use the term “public choice” to refer to them, preferring “political economics” (Hirschman, 1971, 7). Hirschman, however, 
was capable of “doing” political economics in the orthodox way, as the chapter 9 of Bias for Hope uses the “apparatus in indifference and transfor-
mation curves to explain the behavior of an underdeveloped country” in accepting international aid (ibid., 3).
4. Hirschman’s alternative project of political 
economics for citizenship
In Adelman’s words, “by 1978, the spirit of ‘68, 
which had been so decisive for Exit, Voice and Loy-
alty, was looked upon as a rash, aberrant, quixotic 
outburst” (2013, 534). While Hirschman was wide-
ly read by social scientists, he had failed to attract 
the economists’ attention (Swedberg, 1990, 158). His 
distancing from economics is reflected by him join-
ing the School of Social Science at Princeton’s Insti-
tute of Advanced Studies, a place he considered “iso-
lated” from economics (ibid., 157). In his late career, 
he considered himself a full dissident, that “moved 
far away from economics” (Hirschman, 1995, 83). In 
an interview from 1985, he claimed that his greatest 
enemy was the “orthodoxy”, “to always repeat the 
same recipe, the same therapy, to cure different types 
of disease; to not admit the complexity, wanting to 
reduce it at any cost” (Hirschman, 2000 [1985], 96, 
translated) –and this implied the economic ortho-
doxy–.
While one might consider these episodes involv-
ing public choice scholars to be minor, private manu-
scripts show that Hirschman held a bitter resentment 
against Olson14. In a non-published manuscript writ-
ten in the 1970s (“Olson and the collective action”, 
apud Adelman, 2013, 553ff), Hirschman scrutinized 
Olson’s work: he criticized him for ignoring entre-
preneurship, leadership, public service and, most 
important, he disliked the model of economic agent 
adopted by Olson – the purely self-interested man, 
who was nothing but a slave of his desires and exter-
nal incentives. For him, Olson was wrong, and public 
choice did not explain collective action (Hirschman, 
2000 [1985], 93), calling it “nonsensical” and “ab-
surd” (Swedberg, 1990, 159). The tone might be a 
reason why “Olson and the collective action” nev-
er left his archives, neither it is mentioned in any of 
his interviews. Its core ideas, however, would guide 
Hirschman in developing an alternative political eco-
nomics, grounded on a view of economics as a social 
and moral science, instead of rational choice theory 
represented by Downs and Olson15.
The books linked to his political economics pro-
ject are The Passions and the Interests (1977), Shift-
ing Involvements (1982) and The Rhetoric of Reac-
tion (1991), written during his time at the Institute 
of Advanced Studies. The interdisciplinary envi-
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ronment of the institute reinforced his view that the 
social sciences should cooperate more to enlighten 
the process behind economic development (Guiot, 
2017).
Hirschman chose to start his project from a ba-
sic economic concept: interests. The Passions and 
the Interests was a book of intellectual history that 
illustrated how earlier debates were still relevant. 
He wished both defenders and critics of capital-
ism “could improve upon their arguments through 
knowledge of the episode in intellectual history that 
has been recounted here” (Hirschman, 1977, 135). 
He noted that early writers (starting with Augustine 
of Hippo) proposed curbing human passions by pit-
ting them against each other (such as laziness against 
greed). After the 15th century, “interests” came to 
be substitutes for this balancing function. Interests 
“comprised the totality of human aspirations but de-
noted an element of reflection and calculation with 
respect to the manner in which these aspirations were 
to be pursued.” (ibid., 32).
“Interests” started to be used as tools for the im-
provement of statecraft, as a vital factor in the analysis 
of human relations. They had the benefit of being a 
seemingly “neutral” concept to analyze men as they 
were. Montesquieu declared the doux commerce doc-
trine, in which the pursuit of the profit interest through 
commerce would make the violence of wars too costly 
and create more opportunities to obtain wealth. Along 
these lines, the concept of interest mutated towards 
the current economic self-interest. However, reliance 
on interests might have deleterious effects in society, 
something already pointed by authors such as Adam 
Ferguson and Alexis de Tocqueville:
While not invoking the fallacy of composition, they 
put forward a rather similar point: if not everyone is 
playing the “innocent” game of making money, the to-
tal absorption in it of most citizens leaves the few who 
play for the higher stakes of power freer than before to 
pursue their ambition. In this way social arrangements 
that substitute the interests for the passions as the guid-
ing principle of human action for the many can have 
the side effect of killing the civic spirit and of thereby 
opening the door to tyranny. (ibid., 125)
In other words, “liberty is never in greater danger 
than it is when we measure national felicity by the 
blessings which a prince may bestow, or by the mere 
tranquility which may attend on equitable adminis-
tration” (Ferguson, 1995 [1767], 255) 
An increase in wealth may not necessarily in-
crease political freedom, but rather the opposite if 
people value their wealth more than their freedom, 
and if they are willing to accept tyrants if they pre-
serve their wealth. Thus, history provided a warning 
16 Hirschman wrote that “people who have experienced a great deal of disappointment in their search for happiness through private consumption [...] 
are infinitely more ‘ripe’ for collective action than a group that is just setting out on that search” (Hirschman, 2002 [1982], 85). Recent research has 
argued that crying is more common in developed countries because poverty frowns upon crying, with Adam Smith being one of the first scholars 
who noticed it (Paganelli, 2017). Disappointment might follow a similar logic.
against taking for granted the supposed positive cor-
relation between political and economic freedom.
Shifting Involvements, on the other hand, was an 
attempt to tackle policy consequences. The “spirit of 
1968”, which had once challenged Olson’s paradox 
on the impossibility of collective action, had dimmed 
quickly (Hirschman, 2002 [1982], 78). To understand 
this, Hirschman suggested that disappointment played 
an important role. As he put it, “acts of consump-
tion, as well as acts of participation in public affairs, 
which are undertaken because they are expected to 
yield satisfaction, also yield disappointment and dis-
satisfaction” (ibid., 10). The phenomenon of disap-
pointment creates a cycle that alternates between pe-
riods of private interest and public action, depending 
on the level of disappointment. Disappointment with 
accumulated private goods may lead to an increase in 
people’s desire for change, for example16.
In this sense, disappointment recovers the con-
cept of loyalty in EVL. One reason why loyalty was 
important was because people may not use exit as 
the first option. They may try to bargain with hopes 
for a return to quality, but if it does not happen, they 
become disappointed. This disappointment can lead 
people to either retreat to private life or mobilize 
themselves to create alternatives. Among entrepre-
neurs, where disappointment is common, Williamson 
et al (2020, 23) wrote that “while disappointment is 
a negative emotion that is experienced as unpleasant, 
learning from the discrepancy that disappointment 
signals can enable adaptation and protect against oth-
er negative affective and depressive experiences.” 
Thus, in Hirschman’s thought, disappointment might 
be the seeds of change, both at individual and social 
levels.
Hirschman’s criticism of free riding posed an 
important point in the book. According to Olson 
(1965a), unless the group has an incentive struc-
ture, a rational participant will not contribute to it. In 
contrast, Hirschman argued that “far from shirking 
and attempting to get a free ride, a truly maximiz-
ing individual will attempt to be as activist as he can 
manage, within the limits set by his other essential 
activities and objectives” (Hirschman, 2002 [1982], 
86). Hirschman was dissatisfied with it, because it di-
minished the relevance of political participation and 
practice of citizenship at best or eliminated them at 
worst. Action would be exchanged for the passivity 
of the market, creating a “voiceless world” where 
people would “vote with their dollars”. Against this, 
Hirschman sought to demonstrate that “[political] 
participation is not a cost but a benefit” (Hirschman, 
1971, 7) and the idea of voting with their dollars had 
no credence because consumers could be easily ma-
nipulated by corporations (Hirschman, 2002 [1982], 
10). The tools of economics were not enough to un-
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derstand why people participate in politics. Unlike 
Anthony Downs, for example, who considered that 
political parties were useful to “offer citizens a full 
range of ready-made and firm opinions on all issues 
of the day” – a source of free-riding – Hirschman ob-
served something that rational choice theory did not 
capture. For him, there is something leading people 
to join politics because they believe in the political 
values in question or have a sense of political duty. 
In this sense, “there is no such thing as a free ride” 
(Hirschman, 1995, 80).
For Hirschman, there are benefits from public en-
gagement that cannot be captured by mere cost-ben-
efit analysis and free-riding will be spurned. In times 
of change, free riding will be a socially deplorable ac-
tion, contrary to what Olson proposed. As Dowding 
and John (2012, 16) wrote, “Hirschman sees people 
engaging in collective action for expressive reasons 
– that is for fun and because they care about public is-
sues despite potential costs17.” However, public par-
ticipation might decay with higher incomes, with the 
citizen retreating into private life, due to disappoint-
ment and comforts, as it happened with the “spirit of 
1968”, until the cycle repeats again (ibid., 125).
In the last book of the trilogy, The Rhetoric of 
Reaction, we can see again a veiled critique of ra-
tional choice theory. The book was funded by a grant 
from the Ford Foundation to study new conservative 
movements. The book was a tract “against the then 
aggressive and would-be triumphant neoconserv-
ative positions on social and economic policymak-
ing” (Hirschman, 1995, 87). Again, he intended to 
improve the general debate, just as The Passions and 
the Interests18.
He identified three theses adopted by conserva-
tive rhetoric: the perversity thesis (any social change 
perversely exacerbates the problem it was supposed 
to solve), the futility thesis (social transformations 
are pointless, futile) and the jeopardy thesis (even if 
the change has potential, the costs and dangers are 
too great, and they can jeopardize hard-earned con-
quests). Hirschman used them to criticize mainstream 
economics and its conservatism.
Hirschman considered economists to be one of 
the most intransigent groups of social scientists (cf. 
Hirschman, 1991; see his comments on “orthodoxy” 
above). Even when they subscribe to “progressive” 
positions, nominally rejecting conservative ones – 
such as Olson claiming to be a Democrat in his cor-
respondence with Hirschman (Adelman, 2013, 447) 
17 Other authors, however, criticized Hirschman. Moore (1995, 431) argued that Hirschman’s solution is “degenerative” and untestable because “it 
works during some periods but during other periods, a different-and weakly specified-altruistic model explains people’s behavior.”
18 In fact, his main issue is not with conservativism or progressivism per se (the sixth chapter is dedicated to criticizing leftists and progressive ideas 
within the framework of the book), but rather with intransigence. The Brazilian translation of the book is literally titled The Rhetoric of Intransi-
gence (Hirschman, 1992 [1991]), which is arguably a more accurate title.
19 Public choice scholars consider them their precursors (cf. Medema, 2009).
20 Nelson (1991, 22, emphasis added), writing on Mussolini’s rhetorical strategy, observed that the Black Shirts were “antisocialist and antigovern-
ment yet extremely nationalist” and they propagated Mussolini’s strategy of manufactured political confrontation. The role of Pareto, Mosca and 
others in the fascist movement is a controversial topic and Buzaglo (2018) considers that their theories did exclude popular participation from poli-
tics – just as Hirschman feared. However, Piano (2019) argued that this is a misrepresentation of their thought caused by failure of communication, 
both from themselves and their interpreters, and that their pessimism serves to motivate vigilance of elites.
– economists would still enable reactionary and in-
transigent positions due to their reliance on econom-
ic theory itself. The idea of self-regulating markets 
enables the perversity effect to discourage reforms 
that would benefit the population (Hirschman, 1991, 
73). This effect, however, can create a perverse effect 
of its own, by encouraging the population to take a 
passive stance to changes, becoming more and more 
risk-averse and tolerant of authoritarianism, under 
the belief that the market will deliver a better alterna-
tive. Ultimately, far from being the dynamic engine 
of capitalism, the self-regulating market can be one 
of the most conservative institutions of a society, an 
engine of mediocrity.
Economists also enable the futility and jeopardy 
effects by denying that policies, such as fiscal or 
monetary policy, have any effect on society. Econ-
omists adopting rational expectations and public 
choice criticized Keynesian policies because they 
nullified their own intentions, rendering them “inop-
erative, otiose – futile” (Hirschman, 1991, 74). Any 
attempt to change will be rendered pointless because 
agents will exploit loopholes that will deny the in-
tended results. And even if they do make a change, 
will it be worthy? Hirschman cited the example of 
British history in the 19th century, where due to the 
existence of a “cult of the British constitution” (ibid, 
90), many reforms were opposed on the grounds that 
they could undo what had been achieved.
One of the most important consequences he feared 
was the loss of public spirit. He blamed the analysis 
of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and other Italian 
economists, who had earlier studied collective deci-
sion making19, for the rise of fascism in Italy; their 
analysis weakened the faith in democratic institutions 
(Hirschman, 1991, 78). If democratic institutions are 
not to be trusted, especially with the looming threat 
of communism and without a real liberal alternative, 
fascism became a relevant option. The fascist rheto-
ric of a corrupt and selfish elite would not be out of 
place in Mosca and Pareto’s works20. Fascists were 
more competent in articulating themselves than their 
political competitors. In other words, they were bet-
ter at using voice, a sign that voice itself can produce 
populism and worse.
In sum, throughout his project of political eco-
nomics, conventional economists might consider that 
Hirschman failed to produce formal models (e.g., 
Krugman, 1994), but this was never his objective. He 
did not consider formal modelling to be a particularly 
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good strategy for intersecting the social sciences and 
admitted that his philosophy of “trespassing” was 
80% art and 20% science (Swedberg, 1990, 157). In-
stead, he tried to elaborate a macro-theory of political 
participation and citizenship to understand questions 
such as why people vote and why people participate 
in politics. Economic theory alone cannot explain 
these questions and he feared the answers provided 
by rational choice could be harmful to political action 
and the integration of the individual in the society.
5. Conclusion
Hirschman’s work was characterized by “freedom 
from disciplinary boundaries” (Ferraton, Frobert, 
2014). Throughout his career, he remained primarily 
a dissident economist who wanted to improve the so-
cial sciences through alliances with other disciplines 
(Hirschman, 2000 [1985]) – even if he lamented 
having little success in influencing other economists 
(Swedberg, 1990).
Just like members of URPE and PCS, he attempt-
ed to integrate the social sciences into a holistic ap-
proach. His non-compliance with orthodox econom-
ics, however, ensured that his ideas on political econ-
21 Grofman (2002, 41) admitted that “from a sociological point of view, Hirschman really cannot be labeled part of Public Choice”, but still considers 
him important for public choice, without elaborating further. Mueller (2003, 182) only acknowledged his paternity of the EVL model, without dis-
cussing them further. It seems they are doing the same thing Olson (1965b) did: praising Hirschman’s work more for the frame than the painting.
22 In his critique of Olson and Clague (1971), Tillman (1975) pointed to the incompatibility of values between public choice theorists and radical 
economists: Olson and his associates wanted to preserve and improve the capitalist order (and in Virginia tradition’s case, adopt a laissez-faire), 
while radical economists wanted to find an alternative to it. Olson and Clague’s convergence thesis was stillborn. 
23 This concern is present in some public choice authors. Downs (1962), after reviewing criticisms of An economic theory of democracy, admitted that 
a “public interest” might exist, but it is irrelevant. Buchanan and Brennan (1988) wonder if public choice could have a damaging effect on public 
spirit, and this could be avoided by having public choice focusing on the analysis of rules of collective decision.
omy/economics did not penetrate the mainstream of 
the economics profession, even if he is recognized by 
many as a great thinker (Dowding et al, 2000). The 
Economist (2012), for instance, regarded him as one 
scholar who, without a doubt, deserved the Nobel 
memorial prize.
Even though well-known public choice schol-
ars consider him an important contributor to their 
tradition (e.g., Grofman, 2002; Mueller, 2003), 
Hirschman firmly believed his work was at odds with 
public choice21. Therefore, one might find ironic that 
his work has been adapted and expanded by authors 
associated with it (e.g., Dowding, John, 2012). Even 
so, his career illustrates how political economy means 
different things to different people, even if they share 
similar problems and even results.
Hirschman’s values were different from a good 
number of public choice scholars, especially the ones 
from the Virginia tradition22. He feared that a lais-
sez-faire economic attitude would lead to a loss of 
citizen spirit in society23, a voiceless world. His work 
on political economics could also be considered as 
a work on the political economy of citizenship, an 
integral part of economic development that might not 
be properly captured by GDP only.
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